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Abstract
We show that a machine, which knows basic logic and arithmetic and
basic axioms of knowledge, and which is factive (knows nothing false),
can either know that it is factive, or know its own Go¨del number, but not
both.
1 Introduction
This is not a paper about artificial intelligence or conscious machines. But
for motivational purposes, temporarily imagine we did have such a machine,
whatever exactly that entails. We could ask this machine to tell us everything
it knows: to enumerate its knowledge. It would then begin telling us various
things: “1 + 1 = 2”, “there are infinitely many primes”, and so on. It would
also tell us things about its knowledge: “I know that 1+1 = 2”. We can further
restrict our request, asking the machine to list only facts which it knows in the
language of (say) Peano Arithmetic extended by a connective K for knowledge
(formalized in Section 2): “I know 1+1 = 2” becomes “K(1+ 1 = 2)”. We can
at least say one thing about this list of knowledge: it is recursively enumerable
(at least if we let the machine enumerate without outside disturbance).
Conscious or intelligent computers are beyond the scope of this paper, but
the above shows how we can study machine knowledge anyway. Namely, we
study recursively enumerable sets of formulas in a language which includes a
modal operator for knowledge. In this paper, the language will be that of
PA augmented by a unary knowledge operator K. We abuse language and
identify a machine with its set of knowledge. For example, when we say a
machine is “factive”, we mean that its set of of known formulas are all true (in
a background model). If we say a machine “knows Peano arithmetic”, we mean
that the axioms of PA are in the r.e. set.
Trivial Examples. There is the know-nothing machine: we ask it to enumer-
ate its knowledge and it lists nothing. This machine is vacuously factive. We
can say it satisfies the schema K(φ)→ φ. The hypothesis, K(φ), means that φ
∗Email: alexander@math.ohio-state.edu
1
is among the list of known formulas. The conclusion φ means φ is really true.
Again, there is the all-knowing machine: it lists every formula. This machine is
not factive. It does not satisfy K(0 6= 0)→ (0 6= 0) (the hypothesis is true, the
conclusion false). Again, there is the machine which knows exactly the conse-
quences of PA. This machine is factive (if the background universe is N) but it
does not know itself to be factive (the schema K(K(φ)→ φ) fails).
We are primarely concerned with machines which have the following prop-
erties. (which we call the axioms of a knowing machine).
• Knowledge of Tautology: K(φ) whenever φ is tautological.
• Knowledge Modus Ponens: K(φ→ ψ)→ K(φ)→ K(ψ).
• Knowledge of Arithmetic: K(φ) whenever φ is an axiom of PA.
• Closure: K(φ) whenever φ is one of the above assumptions.
• Factivity: K(φ)→ φ. Everything known is true.
Each of these assumptions is plausible, requiring little of the machine in
question. All are standard in epistemology. We are also interested in two addi-
tional properties, and the goal is to show that, together with the above basics,
these properties are individually possible (for some e ∈ N) but are mutually
inconsistent:
• Knowledge of Factivity: K(K(φ)→ φ).
• Knowledge of having Go¨del number e: K(K(φ) ↔ pφq ∈ We), where
“pφq ∈ We” abbreviates a canonical sentence expressing that the Go¨del
number of φ in the eth r.e. set.
In [4], it was shown that a knowing machine cannot know its own Go¨del
number. However, this “implicitly” assumed Knowledge of Factivity. I say this
requirement was “implicit” because it was not explicitly spelled out, but rather
part of a closure requirement: in essence, in the above list of assumptions,
“Closure” and “Factivity” were permuted.
2 A Very Simple Modal Logic
In this section we formalize quantified modal logic. There are many ways to
do this. We take a very simple and weak approach. This approach is so weak
that (unlike many treatments of modal logic) it does not actually depart from
standard first-order logic. By taking such a weak approach to modal logic, we
eliminate a lot of technical difficulty.
Definition 1. Suppose L is a first-order language and K is a symbol not
in L (we will call K an unary modal operator). The first-order language
L (K)obtained by weakly extending L by K is defined inductively as follows:
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1. All the function, constant, and predicate symbols of L are also in L (K).
2. For every formula φ of L (K), L (K) contains a new 0-ary predicate sym-
bol Kφ.
Notation 2. Write K(φ) for Kφ. The abbreviation K(φ) may be pronounced
“φ is known” or “I know φ” or (for brevity) “know φ”.
The notation is applied inductively. For example, we may write K(K(φ)) to
abbreviate KKφ .
Warning. Notation 2 does not play nicely with variable substitution. For
instance K(x = y)(x|z) (the result of substituting z for x) is K(x = y), not
K(z = y). Failure to heed this warning can lead to philosophical paradoxes. In
our treatment, the schemas (∀xφ) → φ(x|t) and (t1 = t2) → φ(x|t1) → φ(x|t2)
are valid, and the Substitution Theorem holds: after all, we have not left classical
first-order logic! These things can fail in some treatments of modal logic (see
Shapiro [5]).
Hereafter, let L (K) be the language of PA weakly extended by K.
Definition 3. By a knowing entity we mean an L (K)-structure M with uni-
verse N, interpreting symbols of PA as usual, such that M satisfies the axioms
of a knowing machine from the Introduction. By a knowing machine we mean
a knowing entity M with the property that {pφq : M |= K(φ)} is r.e.
Note that an entity (hence a machine) is completely determined by the
formulas which it knows. In fact, it would be possible to reformulate Definition 3
and define entities and machines to be sets of formulas; this is what Carlson
does [1] (pp. 59, 61). For our purposes, Definition 3 is more convenient.
3 An Inconsistency Result
William Reinhardt [4] showed that a knowing machine cannot simultaneously
know that it is factive, and also know its own Go¨del number (although every-
thing was formalized in different ways). In this section we offer a streamlined
proof of this result.
Proposition 4. Let e ∈ N and let Σ be the set of axioms of a knowing machine
together with Knowledge of Factivity and Knowledge of having Go¨del number
e. Then Σ is inconsistent.
Proof. By Go¨del’s diagonal lemma, there is a sentence φ such that Peano Arith-
metic proves φ↔ pφq 6∈We.
Work in Σ0 = PA ∪ {K(φ) → φ,K(φ) ↔ pφq ∈ We} (a subset of the
consequences of Σ). By PA, we have φ ↔ pφq 6∈ We. Combining this with
K(φ) ↔ pφq ∈ We, we have K(φ) ↔ ¬φ. Assuming ¬φ, we obtain K(φ), and
then by K(φ)→ φ, we obtain φ. Altogether, this establishes φ.
3
I proved φ from Σ0. Thus there are finitely many axioms σ1, . . . , σn from
Σ0 such that σ1 → · · · → σn → φ is a tautology. Now
Σ |= K(σ1 → · · · → σn → φ) (Knowledge of Tautology)
Σ |= K(σ1)→ · · · → K(σn)→ K(φ) (Knowledge Modus Ponens)
Σ |= K(σ1) ∧ · · · ∧K(σn) (∗)
Σ |= K(φ) (Modus Ponens)
Σ |= pφq ∈ We. (Knowledge of having code e)
Line (∗) is true because for every element σi of Σ0, K(σi) is an axiom in Σ; this
is the only place where we invoke Knowledge of Factivity (one of the σi being
an instance of Factivity). So Σ |= φ, Σ |= pφq ∈ We, and Σ |= φ ↔ pφq 6∈ We,
establishing inconsistency.
Theorem 5. (Reinhardt) There is no knowing machine satisfying Knowledge
of Factivity and Knowledge of having Go¨del number e, for any e ∈ N.
Proof. Such a machine would satisfy the set Σ from Proposition 4.
4 Consistency of a machine knowing itself to be
factive
In this section, we exhibit a knowing machine which possesses Knowledge of
Factivity. We attempt to streamline Appendix B in Timothy Carlson’s paper
[1]. Carlson himself streamlined an argument due to Shapiro [5]. In both,
Kleene’s [3] slash operator was used; we short-circuit it.
Definition 6. Let Σ be the set of axioms of a knowing machine together with
the axioms of Peano Arithmetic. Let Slash(Σ) be the L (K)-model which has
universe N, interprets symbols of PA in the usual way, and interprets knowledge
inductively as follows:
Slash(Σ) |= K(φ) iff Slash(Σ) |= φ and Σ |= φ.
Lemma 7. Slash(Σ) |= Σ. Also, Slash(Σ) satisfies the schema K(K(φ)→ φ).
Proof.
• (Knowledge of Tautology) If φ is a tautology, then Slash(Σ) |= φ and
Σ |= φ, so Slash(Σ) |= K(φ).
• (Knowledge Modus Ponens) Suppose that Slash(Σ) |= K(φ → ψ) and
Slash(Σ) |= K(φ). This means Slash(Σ) |= φ → ψ, Σ |= φ → ψ,
Slash(Σ) |= φ, and Σ |= φ. By Modus Ponens, Slash(Σ) |= ψ and Σ |= ψ.
So Slash(Σ) |= K(ψ).
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• (Knowledge of Arithmetic) If φ is an axiom of PA, then Slash(Σ) |= φ
since Slash(Σ) has universe N and interprets symbols of PA in the usual
way. Also, Σ |= φ since Σ contains K(φ) (Knowledge of Arithmetic) as
well as K(φ)→ φ (Factivity). Altogether, Slash(Σ) |= K(φ).
• (Closure) If φ is an instance of Knowledge of Tautology, Logic, or Arith-
metic, then Slash(Σ) |= φ by the above items. And certainly Σ |= φ. So
Slash(Σ) |= K(φ).
• (Factivity) If Slash(Σ) |= K(φ), then by definition Slash(Σ) |= φ.
• (Knowledge of Factivity) Since Σ contains Factivity as an axiom, Σ |=
K(φ) → φ. We showed Slash(Σ) |= K(φ) → φ. Together these show
Slash(Σ) |= K(K(φ)→ φ).
Corollary 8. For any φ, Slash(Σ) |= K(φ) iff Σ |= φ.
Proof. (⇒) By definition. (⇐) Suppose Σ |= φ. By Lemma 7, Slash(Σ) |= Σ.
Thus Slash(Σ) |= φ. Together, this shows Slash(Σ) |= K(φ).
Theorem 9. There is a knowing machine which possesses Knowledge of Fac-
tivity.
Proof. One such knowing machine is Slash(Σ). It is a knowing entity by Lemma 7.
It is a machine because {pφq : Slash(Σ) |= K(φ)} = {pφq : Σ |= φ} is r.e.
5 Consistency of knowing one’s own Go¨del num-
ber
In this section we will construct a knowing machine which knows its own Go¨del
number. By Section 3, we cannot hope for such a machine to also know itself
to be factive.
Definition 10. For every e ∈ N, let Σe be the set of axioms of a know-
ing machine, along with Knowledge of having Go¨del number e, the schema
K(K(φ)↔ pφq ∈We).
Theorem 11. There is an e ∈ N such that there is a knowing machine which
satisfies Σe. In words: there is a knowing machine with Knowledge of having
Go¨del number e.
Proof. Let Σ
′
e consist of the axioms of PA, along with all the axioms of Σe
except for Factivity, along with the schema K(φ) ↔ pφq ∈ We (φ ranging over
sentences).
For e ∈ N, by a coded consequence of Σ
′
e, I mean the Go¨del number pφq of a
formula φ such that Σ
′
e |= φ. Given e ∈ N, we can effectively write a program to
enumerate the coded consequences of Σ
′
e. By the Church-Turing Thesis, there
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is a total computable function f : N → N such that for every e ∈ N, Wf(e) is
the set of coded consequences of Σ
′
e. By Kleene’s Recursion Theorem, there is
an e ∈ N such that Wf(e) = We. Thus, We is the set of coded consequences of
Σ
′
e. Fix this e hereafter.
Let M be the following L (K)-structure. The universe of M is N, and
symbols of PA are interpreted as usual. Predicate symbols are interpreted by
M |= K(φ) iff Σ
′
e |= φ. I will show M |= Σe, proving the theorem.
• (Knowledge of Tautology) If φ is a tautology, then Σ
′
e |= φ, so M |= K(φ).
• (Knowledge Modus Ponens) If M |= K(φ → ψ) and M |= K(φ) then
Σ
′
e |= {φ→ ψ, φ}, thus Σ
′
e |= ψ, so M |= K(ψ).
• (PA) With universe N and interpreting symbols of PA as usual, M |= PA.
• (Closure, Knowledge of PA, Knowledge of having Go¨del number e) If φ
is an axiom of PA, an instance of K(ψ) ↔ pψq ∈ We, or if K(φ) iis
an instance of Closure, then φ ∈ Σ
′
e by construction, so Σ
′
e |= φ and
M |= K(φ).
• (Having Go¨del number e) M |= K(φ) iff Σ
′
e |= φ, iff pφq is a coded
consequence of Σ
′
e, iff pφq ∈ Wf(e) =We, which holds iff M |= pφq ∈ We
(since M has universe N and interprets symbols of PA as usual).
• (Factivity) By the previous claims, M |= Σ
′
e. Assume M |= K(φ). By
definition, Σ
′
e |= φ. Since M |= Σ
′
e, we have M |= φ.
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